Attachment and Socialization

The Positive Side of Social Influence

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> *When one considers values in general and moral values in particular from a cognitive standpoint. one is faced with the same problem. Cognition does not offer the principle of determination, of preference, of value.*

(Loevinger, 1976, p.43)

The belief that child-parent attachment plays an important role in social development occupies center stage in most contemporary theories of childhood socialization. The origins of this belief are easily traceable to Freud's emphasis on the significance of infant-mother attachment for virtually all aspects of subsequent personality development. Its endurance over the intervening decades has been sustained by a wealth of empirical data linking attachment to a wide range of socialization outcomes in both childhood and adulthood (Waters, Hay, & Richters, 1986).

Included among these are patterns of social competence (Waters, Wippman, & Sroufe, 1979), prosocial behavior (Lieberman, 1977), antisocial behavior (Sroufe, 1983), and behavior problems (Erickson, Sroufe, & Egeland, 1985) in early childhood. In addition, the major longitudinal studies of delinquent and criminal behavior have consistently documented links between family factors and subsequent antisocial behavior (Glueck & Glueck, 1950; McCord & McCord, 1959; West & Farrington, 1977). Prominent among these have been parental characteristics such as lack of warmth, poor supervision, inconsistency, and poor child-rearing practices - factors that have been demonstrated in more recent studies to be associated with anxious child-parent attachment (Ainsworth, Blehar, Waters, & Wall, 1978).

Ironically, the mechanisms of anaclitic and defensive identification proposed by Freud to explain the association between attachment and socialization have largely been invalidated by empirical research. More-over, they have not been replaced in Bowlby's (1969, 1973, 1980) more recent ethological attachment theory by alternative explanatory constructs.

Bowlby himself has long had an interest in the association between attachment and antisocial behavior, and his theory provides a rich source for speculation about attachment and socialization. Moreover, Bowlby accepts the basic premise that children unwittingly identify with-in the sense of modeling themselves after-their parents in the normal course of development. Nonetheless, ethological attachment theory posits no formal mechanism(s) through which child-parent attachment might *explain* the emergence of antisocial behavior; the link remains very much an association in search of an explanation.

The primary aim of this chapter is to rekindle among socialization researchers an interest in child-parent attachment as a powerful and perhaps decisive factor in the socialization process. In the first section we address ourselves in considerable detail to the role posited for attachment in both psychodynamic and more contemporary social learning/cognition views of socialization. Our emphasis is on the chief limitations of each in accounting for the emergence and stability of prosocial and antisocial behavior within individuals.1

In the second section we employ a social influence perspective to integrate the best features of each model into a single theoretical framework that emphasizes the role of child-parent attachment. Within the context of this framework we introduce and discuss a revised (i.e., non-Freudian) concept of child-parent identification as a mediating process to account for the attachment-socialization link.

In the final section we highlight features of this model that diverge from and complement existing models of socialization, with emphasis on its heuris-

tic value for guiding and interpreting future socialization research.

Two Models of Socialization

Among the most enduring of Freud's legacies to psychology have been his insights regarding the nature, significance, and interrelatedness of early attachment relationships and socialization outcomes. Indeed, early child-parent attachment and the course of socialization are virtually inseparable within psychoanalytic theory. It is somewhat ironic, therefore, that the research traditions engendered by Freud's insights-namely, attachment and socialization - have proceeded by and large along separate trajectories. As a consequence of this separation, much of what we currently know about childhood socialization has accumulated outside of a unitary theoretical framework for interpreting its relevance to issues of attachment. We are left instead with two essentially different models of childhood socialization: Freud's psychoanalytic theory, and the more recent social learning and cognition perspectives. These perspectives represent not only different viewpoints on socialization, but distinct historical periods as well. Therefore, our review of existing models in the following section is organized both thematically and chronologically. Contemporary views have been shaped considerably by earlier failures of psychoanalytic theory in the empirical realm, and there is much to be gained through an understanding of how and why they arrived at the roles they posit for attachment.

Psychoanalytic Perspective

Attachment

The central importance of child-parent attachment in Freud's theory of personality is perhaps best captured in his characterization of the infant-mother relationship as ~ without parallel, established unalterably for a lifetime as the first and strongest love object and as the prototype of all later love relationships" (Freud, 1940/1949, p.188). This prototype not only forms the matrix on which subsequent personality development builds, according to Freud, but also provides the motivational core of a great deal of behavior throughout the lifespan. Moreover, the conflicts and defenses rooted in early attachment relationships continue to assert themselves throughout life in the form of various prosocial and antisocial behavior patterns.

Identification

Socialization was described by Freud as the process(es) through which a child's natural erotic and aggressive instincts are gradually brought under the control of the superego. Subsequently, socially unacceptable expressions of these instincts are prevented and/or punished by the superego. Moreover, Freud believed that the superego's characteristic patterns of influence on behavior are formed quite early in life, and remain substantially unchanged throughout the lifespan.

Identification within psychoanalytic theory means much more than a simple imitation of parental behaviors. The superego, in Freud's own term, represents the "precipitate" of parental influence (Freud, 1940/1949, p.16). In particular, Freud believed that children identify with the superegos as well as the situational behaviors of their parents. As such, they are influenced not only by parental personalities, but also by familial, cultural, and societal values and standards reflected in those personalities. As Brown (1965) has noted, a major function of the superego for Freud was to account for the continuity of conscience and moral standards across generations. The attachment-relevant mechanisms through which the superego forms, and which constitute the core of the socialization process according to psychoanalytic theory, are *anaclitic* identification, which leads to formation of the ego ideal, and *defensive* identification, which leads to the formation of conscience. As principal components of the superego, the ego ideal and conscience are characterized as joint regulators of social conduct through their respective emphases on "thou shalt" and "thou shalt not."

As others have pointed out, Freud's views on identification are scattered across almost three decades of his theoretical writing (Bosso, 1985; Bronfenbrenner, 1960). Hence, it is difficult to summarize succinctly a unified portrait of his theory of identification. This difficulty derives in large measure from the fact that Freud often employed the same label to refer to fundamentally different concepts. In addition, his views on the dynamics of identification very much evolved over the years, leaving a difficult trail of theoretical loose ends. For present purposes, however, it is unnecessary to reconcile the ambiguities and discrepancies in Freud's theories of identification. Instead, we can summarize the central thesis of his attachment identification socialization model,

which remained substantially intact throughout his writings.

Anaclitic Identification. This first phase of the identification process, according to Freud, is rooted in the child's initial total dependence on mother for basic biological and emotional needs. As the mother gradually and inevitably withdraws her constant attention, interaction, and affection, the child responds by acquiring the mother's characteristics in the service of becoming her/his own source of reinforcement and comfort. In Freud's terms, the child gives up the mother as a love object, and incorporates her into her/his superego (ego ideal). Thereafter, the superego takes over functions hitherto performed by the mother such as comforting, giving orders, judging actions, and threatening with punishment. A similar process is repeated with the father, and throughout life with various mother- and father-substitutes (e.g., teachers, ad-mired public figures, employers, etc.). These subsequent non~parental identifications, however, are assumed to be substantially less powerful and more transient than prior parental identifications.

Defensive Identification. Although anaclitic or primary identification sets the foundation for socialization within Freud's model, he also posited a process of defensive identification to explain the development of conscience later in the preschool years. The dynamics of this process, subsequently labeled "identification with the aggressor" by Anna Freud (1946), were developed in detail for boys, with little attention to how and why the process emerges in girls. It is therefore necessary to present the dynamics of defensive identification separately for boys and girls.

Boys. As a result of the boy's strong attachment to his mother, he eventually sees himself in competition with his father for the mother's attention and affection (Oedipal complex). This perceived competition in turn results in an intolerable level of anxiety within the child. The chief causes of this anxiety are (1) fear of loss of the mother's love to the father, and (2) fear of loss of the father's love as well as fear of the father's retaliation through actual or threatened castration. Given the child's limited resources for dealing with this crisis, he opts to identify with-become more like-his father.

This so-called defensive maneuver accomplishes two goals. First, by becoming more like his father the boy enhances his potential for remaining the ob-

ject of his mother's love and attention. Second, by so doing he protects himself against his father's retaliation. Not only does his father no longer have a reason to retaliate, but surely the father would never retaliate against someone who is so much like himself. Moreover, the father is more likely to continue loving a son who has developed in his image.

Girls. Freud himself pointed out that the dynamics of defensive identification in girls are "far more obscure and full of gaps" (Freud, 1924, p.177). Obviously, his emphasis on castration anxiety makes no sense in the case of girls, who presumably believe they have already been castrated. Freud therefore supposed that girls hold their mothers-who have also been castrated-responsible for not having protected them from a castrating father. Thus, a love-hate relationship develops with the mother for allowing castration to take place, and similarly a love-hate relationship develops with the father for actually effecting the castration. The dynamics are further complicated by the girl's *increased* attraction to the father in an effort to recapture a penis (Electra complex).

Finally, in an effort to resolve her intolerable level of anxiety over her ambivalent (i.e., love/fear/hate) mother and father relationships, the girl adopts a defensive posture analogous to the defensive maneuver opted for by boys. That is, girls identify with-become more like-their mothers in an effort to ward off her competitive retaliation. At the same time, they assure themselves of their father's continuing love and attention because of their similarity to their mothers. Thus, whereas threat or perceived threat of castration marks the occasion for resolution of the Oedipal complex in boys, the fact of castration marks the beginning of the Electra complex in girls. The details of exactly how and when the Electra complex is resolved in girls were never worked out in Freud's writing. He simply indicated that the Electra complex is abandoned much later in life, and then only incompletely.

Summary. It should be clear from this distilled presentation of anaclitic and defensive identification that they share in common a strong emphasis on the child's emotional ties to his/her parents. In both processes, the strength of the child's identification is directly related to her/his level of anxiety over the threat of loss of parental love and attention. Anxiety level, in turn, is directly related to the strength of child-parent attachment. Although this relation is perhaps more clear and straightforward in the anacli-

tic process, it is nonetheless also at the motivational core of the dynamics of defensive identification. Where normal emotional ties to the parents are missing, the child has no incentive or motivation to model her/himself after the parents or parent substitutes. Such a child "(fails) to build up the identifications which should become the core of a strong and efficient superego, act as a barrier against the instinctual forces, and guide his behavior in accord with social standards" (A. Freud, 1949, p.193).

Weaknesses in Freud's Model(s) of Identification

Freud's theoretical writings on identification provided not only the impetus but also the rationale and direction for much of the early socialization research in psychology, anthropology, and eventually sociology (Wentworth, 1980). For psychologists in particular, the concept of identification was an understandably seductive one. As proposed by Freud, it seemed capable of explaining such diverse behaviors as self-control, self-recrimination, the development and expression of conscience, and sex-role development. Moreover, the processes of anaclitic and defensive identification seemed to lend themselves to fairly straight-forward translations into falsifiable behavioral hypotheses (Fisher & Greenberg, 1978).

Psychoanalytic Language. Beginning in the 1940s and continuing through the late 1960s, researchers systematically subjected components of Freud's theories of attachment and identification to the chain and transit of empirical scrutiny. Unfortunately, most of these efforts were plagued by conceptual and methodological obstacles which ultimately conspired against a productive research enterprise. Perhaps the most notable of these derived from the very language of psychoanalytic theory (Baldwin, 1967/1980). Freud characteristically mixed explanatory metaphors with purely theoretical propositions in his writing, leaving researchers with little foothold for isolating predictions that would serve

as decisive tests of his theory. Related to this is the fact that much of Freud's language defies a straightforward translation into operational definitions. Concepts such as penis envy, castration anxiety, defensive anxiety, and the like are essential components of psychoanalytic theory, yet they lack clear behavioral referents.

Operational Definitions. An inherent problem in psychoanalytic theory is that it is concerned primarily with the unconscious dynamics of thoughts and feelings. The links between these dynamics and overt behavior are explained only in generalities within Freud's writing. Moreover, they are explained at a level of abstraction that allows the same process to give rise to opposite behaviors, and opposing processes to give rise to identical behaviors. As a consequence, it was seldom clear whether experimental failures to find support for psychoanalytic concepts were due to structural weaknesses in Freud's theory, or instead were due to inadequate operationalizations of his concepts. Ironically, studies which appeared at face value to support Freudian concepts were often viewed with skepticism for the same reasons. The translation of Freudian concepts and processes into specific behavioral referents almost always required a creative leap outside the boundaries of psychoanalytic theory (Mowrer, 1950; Sanford, 1955; Sears, 1957; Stoke, 1954), and, in so doing, researchers often incurred the wrath of both critics and proponents of the theory. For proponents of psychoanalytic theory, resulting operational definitions were often viewed as superficial. For critics, such definitions seemed perhaps too close to the theory, and therefore lacked credibility and interpretability. Moreover, necessarily creative operational definitions often resulted in findings that were more parsimoniously interpreted from a non-Freudian perspective.

Let us consider, for example, an experimental study of castration anxiety reported by Sarnoff and Corvin (1959). The experimenters reasoned from Freud's writing that males with high levels of castration anxiety (1) would manifest a greater fear of death in general, and (2) would manifest even higher levels of fear of death when their castration anxiety levels were stirred by exposure to sexually arousing stimuli. Castration anxiety was operationalized in terms of the subjects' self-ratings of emotional arousal in response to viewing a cartoon of two dogs: one dog was depicted as blindfolded with a large knife suspended over its outstretched tail while the other dog observed. Placing aside other important issues of theory and method, one can well imagine a host of problems in defending responses to a dog cartoon as evidence for castration anxiety. The point here is not that the authors were obviously wrong or silly in their choice of an index, but rather that there are simply no external criteria available for evaluating the validity of their choice.

Psychoanalytic Resistance. Difficulties in operationalizing Freudian concepts were further com-

pounded by the resistance of psychoanalysts themselves. Traditional psychoanalytic theorists have long held that psychoanalytic method provides the only legitimate basis for evaluating Freud's theory. As Freud himself argued, " . . . we now claim the right to reject unconditionally any such introduction of practical considerations under the field of scientific investigation" (Freud, 1916/1935, p.24). This public stance, coupled with the difficult language of psychoanalytic theory, compelled many researchers to acknowledge that their studies were based on behavioral *reformulations* of the theory. Thus, Positive findings were not necessarily interpretable as verification of Freud's theory, and failures were easily attributed to weaknesses in a particular reformulation rather than in the theory itself.

In perhaps the most ambitious study of anaclitic and defensive identification, for example, Sears and his colleagues (Sears, Rau, & Alpert, 1965) found it necessary to acknowledge the psychoanalytic parentage of their hypotheses, while at the same time emphasizing the independence of their study from-and in some instances its irrelevance to-psychoanalytic formulations of identification.

Freud's Model of Attachment. Finally, many of Freud's hypotheses about socialization and personality development were predicated on what is now widely accepted as his misunderstanding of the origins and nature of child-parent attachment. The central developmental mechanism in Freud's theory of attachment is drive reduction. In essence, the infant's first affective bond with the mother is posited by psychoanalytic theory to develop through repeated associations of the mother with pleasant feelings resulting from gratification of the infant's basic biological needs. In comparison with other aspects of Freud's overall theory, his model of attachment is quite explicit and therefore lends itself to more or less decisive empirical tests. As a result, his drive reduction hypothesis has been challenged repeatedly by studies that have failed to detect a consistent relation between gratification of biological needs by caretakers and the infant's subsequent attachment behavior toward them (Caldwell, 1964; Maccoby & Masters, 1970; Sears, Maccoby, & Levin, 1957).

Moreover, it has been demonstrated that infants frequently display a great deal of attachment behavior toward individuals who have not been associated with gratification of their basic needs (Ainsworth, 1963; Schaffer & Emerson, 1964). These lines of evidence are congruent with the findings from Harlow's earlier work with non-human primates, particu-

larly his demonstration that infant monkeys prefer to seek comfort from and cling to cloth-covered surrogate mothers, rather than the wire-covered surrogates that feed them (Harlow, 1961). Given the central importance of attachment to Freud's model of socialization and personality development, there can be little doubt that this weak link in his theory also played a decisive role in the dissatisfaction of researchers with their own findings and, eventually, with Freud's theory.

Contemporary Perspectives

Failure in the search for empirical relations consistent with Freud's theories of identification had two discernible impacts on socialization research in psychology. The first was a gradual decline of interest in attachment, identification, and related motivational concepts among socialization researchers. The second was a redirection of socialization research away from individual differences constructs, toward a more general emphasis on basic processes of social learning (Bandura, 1986; Goslin, 1969). Thus, the post-Freudian period in psychology very much reflects a shift away from psychoanalytically *directed* thinking to research and theory that is more accurately characterized as psychoanalytically *inspired;* it also reflects a shift from the top-down to bottom-up approaches to understanding socialization.

As we shall see, the influence of Freud's basic insight concerning the importance of early experience is still evident in the focus of contemporary research on child-parent interaction and parental child-rearing practices. However, his emphasis on the child-parent attachment relationship as a special source of enduring influence has been largely lost.

Attachment

Although attachment and socialization are intimately linked within Freud's framework, post-Freudian research and theory concerning these constructs has proceeded along two separate trajectories.

Ethological Attachment Theory. Along one path, Bowlby's ethological attachment theory has totally replaced the mechanisms of attachment proposed by Freud, while at the same time preserving Freud's integrative perspective on attachment/love relationships across the lifespan (Bowlby, 1969, 1973, 1980). Bowlby's reformulation has also contributed greatly to our understanding of the relation between attachment and the closely related phenomena of grief and mourning in both childhood and adulthood.

Moreover, the empirical research engendered by ethological attachment theory during the past two decades has demonstrated the model's ability to organize and bring coherence to much of what we currently know about the nature and correlates of child-parent attachment (Bretherton & Waters, 1985). As we pointed out earlier, however, Bowlby's theory is not, like Freud's, a grand theory of personality development; it makes no formal attempt to delineate the mechanisms through which child-parent attachment might influence the emergence of prosocial or antisocial behavior patterns.

Later in this chapter we will discuss in considerable detail an integrative model which reintroduces child-parent attachment as a Cornerstone of socialization, and in so doing attempts to bridge the gap between Bowlby's attachment theory and contemporary models of socialization. Before turning to that model, we will consider the role posited for attachment in these contemporary models.

Social Learning Theory. Although post-Freudian socialization research developed in parallel with advancements in ethological attachment theory and research, it has nonetheless proceeded along a separate trajectory, by and large de-emphasizing the "prototype" model of attachment and its implications for socialization. In its place, attachment is typically characterized more narrowly as a source of leverage in parents' efforts to socialize their children.

It is somewhat misleading to speak of contemporary socialization research as a homogeneous enterprise. In fact, it represents quite a diverse body of theory and research, including emphases on parent-child interaction, child-rearing practices, children's peer relationships, children's attributions about themselves and others, and, of course, hybrids of each of these. Most of these areas are homogeneous, however, with respect to the role they assign to child-parent attachment in their working assumptions about socialization. Few theorists even discuss the nature of attachment in their formulations; most seem implicitly to endorse the behavioral or social learning model of attachment formalized by Gewirtz (1972). Elsewhere, we have discussed this model and its assumptions in detail (Waters et a*l.,* 1986). In the present discussion we focus our attention more narrowly on its departures from the prototype" model emphasized by Freud and Bowlby.

First, attachment is viewed within the social learning framework as descriptive shorthand for a learned behavior pattern originating in and maintained by parent-child interactions. Its chief defining characteristics are the manifest preference of parent and child for each other's company and the observable influence each has over the other's behavior. A relatively straightforward relation is therefore assumed between the amount of a child's attachment-relevant behavior (e.g., proximity seeking, separation distress) and the strength of his/her bond with the parent. Conversely, decreases in these behaviors - including normative age-related decreases-are assumed to reflect attenuations in the strength of attachment.

Consistent with this formulation, child-parent attachment is viewed as functionally similar to other relationships in childhood (e.g., peers) and adulthood (e.g., spouses). All such relationships, according to the social learning view, can be evaluated using the same behavioral criteria. Therefore, child-parent attachment is not afforded a unique status as the child's first attachment relationship, except to the extent that parents differ from others in terms of the frequency, duration and intensity of their contact with the child. Note that each of these parameters refers to the *quantity* or amount of parental influence, and not to a *qualitative* difference in the nature of that influence.

Finally, attachment is emphasized as a developmental *outcome* of early experience rather than as a source of influence on later development. Because of its emphasis on situational cues and contingencies, social learning theory neither predicts nor concerns itself particularly with phenomena such as the stability of attachment-relevant behavior across time. Behavioral stability is, in principle at least, explainable in terms of corresponding consistency in situational influences across time. If pressed, therefore, the model might attempt to accommodate behavioral stability by emphasizing the differential strength of behavior patterns (S-R connections) established through early and strong parental influence. This explanation really strains the model, however, because social learning theory contains no mechanism for predicting or explaining the causal priority of early over later experiences. Relations between early attachment and subsequent development are therefore assumed to be due primarily to consistency across time in parental child-rearing practices and other environmental contingencies. Not only is this assumption at odds with what we know about the stability of child-rearing practices, but the generalization of child-rearing effects beyond the time and space

boundaries of family life is inconsistent with the basic postulates of the social learning model. When contingencies imposed by socialization agents for prosocial and antisocial behavior are removed, the model predicts a return to baseline patterns of behavior. In the absence of either an innate or internalized disposition for altruistic behavior, the social learning model provides no basis for expecting this baseline pattern to reflect other than a selfish desire for immediate gratification (Grusec, 1985).

Identification

Everyone familiar with the literature on childhood has been confronted with multiple uses of the term "identification," usually embedded in descriptions or explanations of socialization. Despite its popularity in usage, there is no single definition that is-or could be-consistent with all of the contexts in which the term identification is employed. It has been used variously as a synonym for internalization, modeling, imitation, and role-taking, to name a few. Not only do each of these phenomena differ semantically and conceptually from each other, but none refers to the theories or processes of identification introduced by Freud. These seemingly inconsistent Uses of the term identification are easily reconciled, however, when one realizes that there are three senses in which it has been used in the literature on socialization: as a *process of* socialization, as a *disposition* or motive to behave like another, and more simply as a label for *behavioral similarity* with another person.

Only the latter two uses are evident in contemporary socialization research. Discussions of identification as a process that seemed to dominate research and theory through the 1960s (Goslin, 1969) are virtually non-existent in contemporary socialization literature. When such references are made, they are almost always in the form of historical footnotes (e. g., Bandura, 1986, p.484), and refer specifically to difficulties with Freud's theories. Given the conceptual and methodological problems common to Freud's theories of attachment and identification, it is not surprising that they share similar fates in contemporary socialization research. We have already seen that the social learning reformulation of attachment reflects a more or less deliberate sacrifice of the prototype model and its implications in exchange for an operational definition with clear behavioral referents. Similarly, the inability of researchers to Surmount the ambiguities and inconsistencies of Freud's theories of identification led ultimately to its abandon-

ment for safer empirical ground. And, just as attachment without its motivational (i.e., prototype) core was reduced to and indexed by behavioral dependency, identification without attachment as its motivational core became "intermittently reinforced generalized imitation, indexed by behavioral similarity" (Gewirtz, 1969, p.159).

Summary

In summary, the literature on early childhood reflects two fundamentally different views of the socialization process - each with its own strengths and weaknesses. The Psychoanalytic perspective offers a theoretically rich account of socialization through its prototype model of child-parent attachment and the related processes of anaclitic and defensive identification. It highlights the unique nature of early attachment, and emphasizes its enduring significance for virtually all aspects of personality development. This prototype model held considerable appeal for early socialization researchers because of its promise for bringing coherence to much of what we know about continuities in social development. And it held particular promise for explaining why children characteristically internalize socially valued standards of behavior initially taught and modeled by their parents.

The success of Freud's model in the empirical arena, however, was extremely limited. Not only was child-parent attachment poorly understood at the time, but the mechanisms of identification proposed by Freud to explain its influence on development proved inherently resistant to empirical scrutiny. Following a lengthy post-Freudian period of unrequited theoretical and empirical interest in identification, socialization researchers found it necessary to free themselves from the constraints of Freudian theory, and from the ambiguities of motivational constructs in general. This freedom has allowed researchers to gain impressive empirical ground during the past two decades on a wide range of socialization phenomena. We have learned a tremendous a mount about general processes of social learning and cognition, modeling, imitation, and the conditions under which children are likely to be influenced toward prosocial and antisocial behavior (Bandura, 1986).

Unfortunately, with the associated decline of interest in theoretical constructs, much of this evidence has accumulated outside the context of an integrative framework that views the course of socialization in a developmental context. Thus, although we have

learned much about the *parameters* of situational influence, we know less about the *boundaries* of that influence, and less still about who is likely to be influenced under what circumstances and, perhaps most importantly, why. Yet it has long been clear that these are among the most important questions facing socialization researchers. And it has become increasingly evident that meaningful answers will require theoretical frameworks that can aid in the synthesis and interpretation of existing socialization data, while at the same time providing a guide for future research.

An Integrative Model

The early exclusion of attachment theory from research into basic processes of social learning and cognition was an understandable and perhaps necessary strategy. Although the resulting gains on these separate fronts have been impressive, neither focus *alone* can explain the emergence of a generalized disposition toward prosocial or antisocial behavior. Theories of social learning and cognition have been essential to our understanding of the mechanisms through which secure attachment relationships arise. And they have been equally successful in shedding light on important mechanisms of socialization. These mechanisms are not sufficient, however, to account for the generalized disposition toward prosocial behavior across time and situations that is the hallmark of an effective socialization process. Similarly, the prototype model of attachment holds considerable potential as a motivational cornerstone for socialization theory. Lest the realization of this potential once again founder on the shoals of empiricism, it will require a detailed specification of the processes through which attachment exerts its influence.

The Correlates of Secure Attachment

We know from existing research that characteristics of caregiver behavior that seem to engender secure child-parent attachment include availability, patience, consistency, contingent responsiveness, facilitation, cooperation rather than interference with the infant's ongoing behavior, and the maintenance of an affectively positive climate for interaction (Ainsworth *et al.,* 1978; Grossman, Grossman, Spangler, Suess, & Unzner, 1985). We know also that when early parent-child interactions have been harmonious, the child will develop a secure attachment relationship and a wide range of socially valued concurrent and predictive correlates. Included

among these are personal attributes such as self-esteem, social competence, self-control, empathy, ego-resilience, and positive affect. Securely attached children have also been found to be more reciprocal (e.g., sharing, successful verbal requests, social initiation, and shared laughter) in their interactions with peers, as well as more attentive, sociable, cooperative, and compliant with adults than are anxiously attached children. Thus, secure child-parent attachment is associated not only with multiple indices of personal competence, but also with behavior patterns that very much reflect a generalized pro-social orientation toward others (Waters *et al.,* 1986).

Research and theory during the past decade have contributed greatly to our understanding of the knowledge, skills, and expectations that children acquire in the context of secure attachment relationships (Bowlby, 1969, 1973, 1980; Bretherton & Waters, 1985). It is not clear from such analyses, however, *why* these accomplishments are so characteristically associated with subsequent prosocial versus antisocial behavior outcomes. Or, perhaps more accurately, it has been deceptively easy to assume that these outcomes follow "naturally" from secure attachment relationships, without asking ourselves why. In fact, a little reflection will reveal that there is nothing at all obvious or self-evident about the link. It is well known, for example, that the most troublesome antisocial children, delinquents, and adult criminals are often among the most knowledgeable in terms of how to evaluate and behave in social situations, and how to anticipate accurately the likely responses of others (Cleckley, 1982; Wilson & Herrnstein, 1985). Yet these skills are employed in the service of antisocial rather than prosocial behaviors. Thus, although these characteristics are obviously necessary to acts of pro-social behavior, they are by no means sufficient to explain its emergence and continuity within individuals. Neither are we brought any closer to an understanding of prosocial motivation by knowing that a child is securely attached to his/her parent(s). There are certainly good reasons to expect prosocial behavior toward attachment figures from such a child, but how and why this should generalize across individuals, situations, and time, remain important questions.

Attachment and Identification

Elsewhere, we have outlined a rationale and framework for reintroducing the concepts of attachment and identification to mainstream research and

theory on childhood socialization (Waters *et al.,* 1986). In brief, this developmental model holds that child-parent attachment and characteristics of parental modeling and child-rearing practices exert a major interactive influence on a wide range of socialization outcomes in early and middle childhood. In particular, it holds that stable patterns of secure attachment engender processes of child-parent identification in early childhood, and identification then becomes an important moderator of subsequent parental influence.

Identification, according to this model, is an age-appropriate response to the continuation of an interaction history that earlier gave rise to secure child-parent attachment. It begins to develop and is manifest during the preschool years through the child's patterns of (a) differential attentiveness to and preference for-rather than mere submissiveness to-parental approbation, values, and standards for behavior, and (b) responsiveness-rather than mere conformity-to parental socialization demands.

In a word, we are proposing that attachment contributes to socialization outcomes by rendering children more *socializable.* In so doing, we are highlighting a motivational dimension of the socialization process not easily addressed by more traditional models. This motivational core cuts across an array of socialization outcomes, and is reflected *inter alia* in the child's *willingness* to obey, beyond mere obedience; *co?icern* about, beyond mere knowledge of, socially prescribed rules and roles; and *participation* in, beyond mere conformity to, the broader social community. In essence, the model proposes that this generalized prosocial disposition is acquired gradually through the child's history of participating in and benefiting from a prosocial system of reciprocal, cooperative interdependence with others. The socialization process, within this framework, is not portrayed-primarily at least-as a struggle between the child's selfish desires for immediate gratification and the demands of society. It is characterized instead as a process through which the child learns through her/his own experiences how personal gains can be maximized through participation in a prosocial system of commerce with others.

In the discussion that follows, we describe briefly the normative socialization process in terms of overlapping themes in the child's development: encapsulation during infancy, and commitment during early and middle childhood.

Encapsulation During Infancy

Ethological attachment theory and the research inspired by it converge to portray the secure attachment relationship as a prototype of prosocial commerce. It is a system in which the child has learned, through the cooperation and facilitation of attachment figures, to maximize the benefits available from and through their interactions. By virtue of the child's limited contact during the first few years with rule systems that differ dramatically from those of the family, he/she is virtually encapsulated within this system and its initially implicit rules for engaging others, and through them, the environment.

Beginning in the first year of life, the quality of child-parent attachment develops and is maintained through mutual attentiveness to and cooperation with signals between partners. In early infancy, these signals are necessarily immediate, specific, situational, and non-verbal (although often vocal). As the child develops and acquires new abilities, h6wever, there is a corresponding increase in the dimensions and demands of the relationship for both partners. Ultimately, the relationship evolves into what Bowlby has termed a "goal-corrected partnership" in which the child becomes increasingly aware of the attachment figure's goals, and his or her strategies for accomplishing them. This awareness is then reflected in the child's enhanced ability to organize and coordinate his own experience with the goals, expectations, and demands of attachment figures.

Maintaining cooperative interaction with an attachment figure gradually requires attentiveness to less immediate, more general, and increasingly verbal signals and cues. At the same time, it requires of attachment figures a sensitivity to the child's capabilities and needs for organization, a readiness and ability to adopt new strategies that will facilitate the child's assimilation of and/or accommodation to novel socialization demands, and the continued maintenance of a positive affective climate. Within the context of a secure relationship, attachment figures gradually and consistently escalate their expectations, monitoring carefully the child's ability to recognize, interpret, and respond to their demands. Thus, whatever stressors these changes in the relationship might otherwise bring are minimized by the facilitative attachment figure. As a consequence, the child continues to benefit maximally and suffer minimally from the relationship as its demands and dimensions expand.

It is within the context of this interaction history that the child also develops the powerful affective bond with attachment figures that Freud emphasized so strongly as the prototype of all future love relationships. Bowlby and others have preserved this prototype notion and its implications by discussing attachment in terms of "working models" (Bowlby, 1973, p. 203) and "assumptive worlds" (Parkes, 1982, p. 299). These metaphors refer to both the child's and parent's systems of expectations, beliefs, feelings, and attitudes about themselves, each other, and the world, based on their previous experiences.

The child, according to this view, constructs an initial working model of attachment figures consistent with her/his history of interactive experiences with those figures. For the securely attached child, this model will typically be characterized by positive feelings toward attachment figures, and the expectation that they will be reliable, sensitive, responsive, and available in times of need. Moreover, because this working model is the child's first well formulated model of human relationships in general, it will also influence her/his initial expectations about sibling, peer, and other adult relationships. In addition, because the child's working models of self and attachment figures are initially closely intertwined, a history of successful participation in a secure attachment relationship will also engender self perceptions of competence and self-esteem.

Similarly, when early child-parent interactions have been harmonious, parents will develop an equally positive working model of the child. And because this working model is also constructed from a particular interaction history, parents of a securely attached child will develop positive expectations about the future. Most notably, these expectations will reflect confidence about the abilities, cooperativeness, trustworthiness, and future socializability of the child. Conversely, if early child-parent interactions have not been harmonious, parents may be less likely to provide facilitating, cooperative, affectively positive, and age-appropriate rearing experiences for that child in the future.

It should be clear from this perspective that the period of encapsulation provides attachment figures with a set of more or less optimal socialization conditions. The child during this period is virtually insulated from exposure to dramatically different and/or potentially conflicting and inconsistent rule systems. Consequently, parents are in a powerful position to organize the child's experiences around a coherent and consistent set of rules and principles. They are therefore in a unique position to shape the child's initial models of him/herself, other people, and the world at large.

When these advantages of the encapsulation period have been exploited judiciously by sensitive and facilitating caretakers, a predictable outcome is the child's development of a secure attachment(s) and its concurrent correlates. We believe that the seeds of prosocial motivation are very much present within the context of secure relationships. It would doubtless be an overstatement to characterize the child as having made a conscious commitment to prosocial commerce at this point. Nevertheless, there is a limited though important sense in which the securely attached child is already *behaviorally* committed, by virtue of her/his active participation in the establishment and maintenance of an inherently prosocial child-parent attachment system. The child's prosocial motivation-or disposition to continue organizing her/his experience around prosocial themes-stems from and is maintained by the powerful reinforcing value of rules and principles which define the prosocial system through which he/she has benefited. It is through the system itself, beyond discrete events within that system, that the child has experienced the world and others in it as coherent, reliable, worthy of engaging, and secure. Equally important, it is the system itself that renders the child's world an orderly and predictable place through its guidelines and principles for future action.

Commitment During Early and Middle Childhood

During the first year(s) of life, the rudimentary parameters of pro-social commerce are already implicit in the immediate contingencies governing the securely attached child's interactions with and feedback from and through primary attachment figures. Gradually, as the child's cognitive and affective capacities develop, the rules and principles of this system are further elaborated and articulated by attachment figures through the complementary socialization processes of explicit instruction, reasoning, induction, and modeling. For the securely attached child, these processes are simply age-appropriate extensions of the rule system in which he/she has been participating, and from which he/she has been benefiting.

The boundaries of encapsulation are inevitably eroded as the child is gradually exposed to the alternative behaviors and potentially opposing rule/value systems of others. For some children this exposure begins quite early through television, and through interactions with and observations of older siblings and their friends, relatives, and family friends. For other children, particularly those from single child families and/or families that are otherwise relatively insulated from external influences, the period of encapsulation may be extended considerably. In either case, it is inevitable that parents lose their privileged status as exclusive gatekeepers of the child's experience. Whether and to what extent the child's exposure to non-parental influence also translates into an erosion of parental influence may provide one of the earliest indices of the child's socialization gains from the encapsulation period. That is, the introduction of relatively novel, competing systems of commerce, coupled with a decrease in direct parental supervision, represent the first serious challenges to a system of rules and standards which earlier defined and in some sense constrained the child's experience. These challenges confront children with their first opportunities to deviate, or to demonstrate commitment to parental standards of conduct. It is at this point that the concept of commitment may bear a more substantive and somewhat less tautological interpretation than our earlier reference to behavioral commitment during the encapsulation period.

Contrasting Views of Socialization

A consideration of the role of commitment in socialization requires a shift in levels of discourse. Our characterization of encapsulation is faithful to the available data on early parent-child relationships, and to what can be inferred reasonably from those data. With notable exceptions in the sociology literature, however, the concept of commitment has not received empirical attention in socialization research (Hirschi, 1969). As we discuss in more detail below, most existing models of socialization rely instead on anxiety reduction and avoidance of punishment as primary motivational forces. The present model, in contrast, emphasizes a more positive motivational core, and suggests that the concept of a child's commitment to prosocial commerce may provide a much needed heuristic for understanding individual differences in adherence to socially valued standards of conduct. The potential role of commitment is perhaps best understood by first examining the self-imposed limitations of alternative socialization models.

Anxiety and Negative Influence

Both psychoanalytic and contemporary models of socialization characterize the process primarily in negative terms, with particular emphasis on the struggle between the child's desires for immediate gratification and parental/societal demands. As we have already seen, the dynamics of this struggle are quite explicit in Freud's writings. And, although contemporary views make no such commitment to underlying dynamics, they nonetheless tacitly subscribe to the basic premise of socialization as fundamentally a process of taming. That is, they assume that the primary goal of socialization is to effect in children "a change from self-interest to interest in others" (Grusec, 1985, p.263), and to "substitute societal demands for personal desires" (Grusec, 1985, p 275). Unfortunately, this view also implies that the successful socialization process is one in which society prevails at the expense of the individual; as in all zero-sum systems, someone's gain necessarily implies someone else's loss.

This essentially negative view is also reflected in the cognitive and affective mechanisms emphasized in existing socialization models. Within psychoanalytic theory, the strength of identification is tied directly to the child's level of anxiety over the threat of loss of parental love. Anxiety level, in turn, is directly related to the strength of child-parent attachment. Contemporary social learning views also emphasize the primacy of love withdrawal as an anxiety-inducing source of parental socialization leverage. Children, according to this view, behave in accordance with parental standards primarily in the service of reducing their anxieties over possible loss of parental love. Note that the emphasis here is on the child's fear of not being loved rather than a desire to be loved, a fear of parental disapproval rather than a desire for parental approval, a fear of doing the wrong thing, rather than a desire to do what is considered right, and so forth.

Finally, this negative bias is evident in much of the contemporary emphasis on models of parental influence based on well known principles of insufficient and oversufficient justification, cognitive dissonance, and minimal sufficiency (Lepper, 1985). Particularly noteworthy in this regard are analyses of parental persuasion techniques and children's attributions about the causes of their own behavior. This model holds generally that if parents employ just

enough subtle pressure to elicit compliance without also eliciting conscious awareness, children will attribute their behavior to internal rather than external causes. That is, children will be duped into thinking that they-and not their parents-are the cause of their own prosocial behavior. This self-attribution, in turn, presumably increases the future likelihood that the child will act in accordance with her/his prosocial self-image.

Contrasting Views of Socialization

The present model, in contrast, emphasizes a more positive view of socialization. It does not assume that children either sacrifice their individuality or give up their self-interests in response to parental/ societal demands. Nor does it assume that children adopt a prosocial orientation to others primarily out of fear and anxiety, or because they are tricked into believing that they are prosocial. Instead, it holds that children learn both how and why to define their interests, goals, and desires within the context of a broader social network. Only the *how* of this system (i.e., its rules and principles, and the skills needed to actively participate) can be accounted for by familiar processes of social learning and cognition (e.g., reinforcement and punishment, reasoning, induction, modeling). The *why* of a child's participation-that is, the child's level of commitment to prosocial commerce-derives in large measure from whether he or she has benefited consistently from this system in the past and can reasonably expect to continue benefiting in the future. The most effective socialization process, from this perspective, is one that consistently demonstrates to children through their successes and failures ways in which their desires can be aligned with and accomplished more reliably and satisfactorily through prosocial, rule-governed commerce with others.

There are, of course, significant elements of struggle throughout the socialization process. And there is abundant empirical evidence for the effectiveness of influence techniques based on anxiety, guilt arousal, and other forms of subtle, negative pressure (Aronson, 1981; Cialdini, 1984). It would therefore be a mistake for any theory to deny or ignore the role of such factors in the socialization process. Our point more simply is that these mechanisms *alone* do not provide the necessary foundation for an effective and efficient socialization process. They are no doubt necessary, highly effective, and desirable in gaining certain types of situational com-

pliance. Alone, however, they are not sufficient to explain the normative developmental outcome of what appears to be a generalized prosocial disposition. In fact, a number of practical and theoretical considerations suggest that a socialization process based primarily on these negative mechanisms is unlikely to ensure compliance or conformity in the long run, let alone engender a positive orientation toward others.

Let us consider, for example, the problems inherent in relying on a child's anxiety over possible loss of parental love as a primary source of socialization leverage. If the child's primary motivation in the face of temptation is to avoid or reduce anxiety about the possibility of parental censure, compliance is only one of several available strategies. Obvious alternatives to compliance include not getting caught, or, once caught, to lie about the offending behavior. Each strategy holds potential for avoiding parental censure. When the child is under the direct surveillance of parents, of course, these latter options might not be considered viable-particularly among older children, who are more experienced at and capable of assessing risk. In more ambiguous circumstances, however, these latter options might be even more attractive than compliance to a child who is primarily interested in avoiding censure. Compliance ensures avoidance of parental censure at the expense of the desired behavior. On the other hand, not getting caught and lying when caught also circumvent parental censure, while at the same time allowing the child to engage in forbidden behavior. Why then, as in the normative case, do children more characteristically opt for compliance over its alternatives? Similar considerations render implausible the premise that children can be fooled-for very long, at least-into thinking that they are pro-socially motivated through the use of subtle parental pressure. As Maccoby (1985) has pointed out, "(children) develop uncanny skills at detecting the iron hand within the silken glove" (p.366). Moreover, we know that the most troublesome misbehavior often occurs in the absence of parental and other supervision. Why, then, do such Occasions not lead with equal force to self-attributions of internalized antisocial motivation?

Commitment and Cost-Benefit

The concept of cost-benefit offers a valuable heuristic for addressing such questions, because it focuses attention on multiple determinants of behavior. From a social learning perspective, a decision to en-

gage in any particular behavior can be conceptualized broadly as a function of differential weights assigned by a child to the costs and benefits associated with compliance versus non-compliance. Thus, if parents are both vigilant about misbehavior and sensitive to subtle changes in behavior that might reflect attempts at deception, their children should learn to assign a higher weight to the risk of getting caught. If parents are also consistent in their punishment of misbehavior and/or deception, their children should also assign a higher weight to the cost of misbehavior. In short, if non-compliance under similar conditions in the past has not paid off, a child might reasonably be expected to comply under similar conditions in the future. Conversely, children who have more consistently benefited from non-compliance under similar circumstances in the past will be more likely to engage in non-compliance in the future.

On a superficial level, the cost-benefit model seems obviously true and perhaps therefore too simplistic. Upon closer scrutiny, however, the model becomes at once more elegant and complex as one considers individual differences in the relative weights a child might assign to (1) the costs and benefits associated with compliance, (2) the costs and benefits associated with non-compliance, (3) the risks associated with getting caught or discovered in a deception, and (4) the costs associated with getting caught. From the standpoint of the present model, commitment is a crucial variable in such analyses because of its potential for differentially weighting the benefits (both short and long term) of compliance and the costs of non-compliance. That is, commitment as we have conceptualized it implies something theoretically important about the benefit or value to the child of the expectations, opinions and continued cooperation of others, as well as the value to the child of future opportunities for continued participation.

Punishment versus Penalty

The importance of commitment to socialization is perhaps best captured in the seldom made distinction between *punishment* and *penalty* as potential costs of deviant behavior (Nadel, 1953). Whereas punishment refers to the relatively immediate, specific, and often short-term negative consequences of a deviant act, penalty refers to less immediate, more general, and longer-term consequences. For example, an act of deliberate disobedience may be punished variously by denying the child access to television for a restricted period, scolding, spanking, and/or other commonly used control techniques. The penalties for disobedience, on the other hand, may include parental disappointment, a loss of parental favor, and attenuation of the parents' trust of the child, a change in their expectations about future compliance, and a corresponding change in the freedoms and opportunities they make available to the child based on these expectations. Thus, in contrast to specific punishments invoked for a particular offense, these types of penalties may have wider ranging consequences. For the child who is committed to-who has learned to value-parental favor, trust, and approval, the penalties for deviant behavior may represent potential costs that far outweigh immediate, specific, and short-term punishments. For the child who has *not* benefited from prosocial commerce, on the other hand, these penalties will not constitute meaningful costs. The costs of deviant behavior for such a child may be assessed entirely in terms of relatively immediate punishments.

It follows from these considerations that the importance of commitment lies in the distinction between self-control and control by others. The child who is committed to a prosocial orientation is in a real sense self-motivated to preserve his/her status within a prosocial system. Violations of the rules and principles which define the system may threaten that status and all that it implies. Conversely, children who are not committed have nothing to lose by deviating from a prosocial orientation beyond the immediate consequences of their actions. They may be controllable in the short term by immediate contingencies administered by others, but cannot be counted on to self-govern their behavior along prosocial lines in the absence of these contingencies.

A child's commitment as we have conceptualized it may seem at first glance to provide parents with additional negative socialization leverage. That is, one might easily conclude that a child who is heavily committed to prosocial commerce should be that much more sensitive and responsive to explicit threats of love withdrawal and other symbols of disenfranchisement. From the standpoint of attachment theory, a heavy reliance by parents on negative withdrawal techniques is not only antithetical to, but is also likely to undermine the foundation of, a secure attachment relationship. After all, there is nothing very secure about a base that constantly threatens not to be there.

The available data suggest that parents of securely attached children are unlikely to rely heavily on such negative techniques. Moreover, it suggests that they have less need to resort to these techniques. One of the many risks inherent in relying on punishment and love withdrawal as primary control techniques is that a child might habituate to threats and/or stop caring about the penalties. If, however, as a result of a secure attachment relationship and all that it implies, the child is self-motivated to continue benefiting from parental/societal favor, etc., then threats of love withdrawal and its associated penalties (e.g., future uncertainty, loss of freedom, privilege), will be particularly potent because they are in a real sense self generated. It is only in this sense that a child's actions can be meaningfully described as self-controlled.

Attachment to Deviant Parents

Our emphasis on attachment, commitment, and prosocial behavior tacitly addresses a question raised by Kagan (1982) about the implications of a child's secure attachment to deviant parents. If the child adopts parental standards and values that are not in accord with those of society, will such a child not be at a disadvantage at a later age? There are really two answers to this question. Certainly from the standpoint of traditional views of identification-particularly Freud's - one might be led easily to this conclusion. According to psychoanalytic theory, the child identifies with the parent's superego, which is the seat of conscience. Thus, if a child is raised by criminal or otherwise deviant parents, he/she is also expected to adopt deviant standards and values.

Within the present model, however, there is no basis for this expectation. That is, it matters not whether a parent is deviant per se in a particular domain of functioning such as a criminal career. What matters is whether the parent's deviance also translates into a non-prosocial system of commerce governing interactions with and/or modeled for the child. From the standpoint of attachment theory, the types of interactions and child-rearing practices that engender and maintain secure child-parent attachment are inherently prosocial. It is therefore unlikely that significant deviations from this type of system will lead to a secure attachment relationship.

In principle, of course, it is possible for a parent to interact with a child in ways that engender a secure child-parent relationship, yet still engage in deviant and/or criminal activities which are wittingly or unwittingly modeled for the child. The available data concerning child rearing orientations of criminal parents, however, suggest that this may be an unlikely scenario. West and Farrington (1973), for example, reported that criminal fathers in their sample disapproved of criminality in their sons. More generally, West (1982) found in the same sample that "parental attitudes toward delinquency were almost always censorious, regardless of the parents' own delinquent history" (p.49). In a related vein, Wheeler (1967) cited a substantial body of research documenting a high degree of intolerance for deviant behavior among those of lower educational and socioeconomic attainment. Even criminal parents are likely to express allegiance to the prevailing norms of society; they operate to "foster obedience to a system of norms to which (they themselves) may not conform" (Hirschi, 1969, p.108). Finally, Hirschi found in his classic study of high-school students that those attached to a low-status parent were no more likely to become delinquent than those attached to a high-status parent. Although Hirschi defined attachment in much broader terms than those of ethological attachment theory, his findings are nonetheless consistent with the expectations of the present model.

CONCLUSION

More than two decades ago, Bronfenbrenner called for a moratorium on theoretical speculations about the origins and nature of identification, and redirected researchers to "the more modest and at once more challenging task of discovering what phenomena do in fact exist that require theoretical explanation" (1960, p.39). The field of socialization research has come full circle during the intervening decades. We have learned much about the correlates and stability of prosocial and antisocial behavior, and we have succeeded considerably in documenting the basic processes of social learning and cognition that play a major role in social influence. At the same time, we still know relatively little about *who* is likely to be influenced toward prosocial or antisocial behavior, under *what* circumstances, and *why*. These questions have always been the *raison d'être* of socialization research and theory, and it is clear that meaningful answers will require theoretically rich models capable of mirroring complex motivational phenomena.

Freud's ambitious attempt to construct such a model has been criticized over the years on conceptual, theoretical, and empirical grounds. Nonetheless, his basic insights concerning the enduring signifi-

cance of parent-child relationships, and his emphasis on the child's internalization of socially valued standards of conduct, continue to have a pro-found impact on our thinking about issues of socialization.

The model we have outlined preserves what we believe to be the chief strengths of both psychoanalytic and contemporary models of socialization. Namely, it reflects Freud's insights concerning the enduring significance of child-parent attachment, while at the same time drawing heavily from existing research on social learning and cognition for its specification of the mechanisms through which identification emerges. It nonetheless differs significantly from existing frameworks by emphasizing a much more positive view of the socialization process.

In abbreviated form, the attachment-identification model posits that a secure child-parent attachment relationship implies something important about the quality of the child's experiences to that point. Specifically, it indexes the extent to which the child has managed to participate in and benefit from an inherently prosocial system of commerce with others. In a very limited and perhaps tautological sense, the child is behaviorally committed to prosocial commerce at this point. As the child develops and the principles of this system are further elaborated and extended by sensitive and facilitating caregivers, this commitment intensifies and is manifest in her/his willingness to obey, concern about socially prescribed norms, and active participation in the broader community. In short, the child identifies with the particular form of commerce with and through others from whom he/she has learned to maximize benefits and minimize losses.

Although we have concentrated our attention on the seeds of socialization in infancy and childhood, this is not a claim that the quality of a child's early attachment(s) in any way ensures or determines or causes particular developmental outcomes. Rather, a secure attachment relationship is an interim developmental outcome which *inter alia* serves as a marker for a particular type of interaction history with caretakers. In the normative case we would expect such patterns to continue, ultimately giving rise to the child's commitment to prosocial commerce. Initial working models of self and others become the filters through which a child selects and interprets subsequent experience, resulting in a bias toward continuity. From an individual differences perspective, however, there are also numerous factors that might in-

tervene to alter one's pattern of development. Obviously, parents may change their availability, sensitivity, and/or skills as parents, and children can learn new ways of orientations and insights. Thus, as Sroufe (1987) has pointed out, although there is a great deal of momentum toward continuity, there is ample opportunity for change as well.

At present, we have only limited knowledge of the conditions that influence continuity and discontinuity in socialization trajectories. And we have only begun to understand how particular individual characteristics and experiences of parents and children influence the emergence and maintenance of prosocial and antisocial behavior. As we learn more about these factors, they will no doubt play an important role in subsequent elaborations and refinements of the general model.

Footnotes

1. Although meaningful theoretical distinctions can be made among various forms of anti-social (Loeber, 1982; Loeber & Dishion, 1983) and prosocial (Radke-Yarrow, Zahn-Waxler, & Chapman, 1983) behavior, both terms are used in this chapter as broad references to characteristic patterns of behavior.

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